

Comparative Analysis of Three Proposed Federal Constitutions for Lebanon

Method: Substance over labels. Every finding below traces the *operative* wiring — who appoints whom, who overrides whom, where residual power and the tax base sit, who has the last word — and ignores self-description ("subsidiarity," "sovereignty," "bottom-up"). Where a document's claim and its mechanics diverge, that gap is scored as a coherence failure, not smoothed over. Silence/ambiguity is treated as a defect (an unresolved question defaults to a real-world outcome, usually reverting power upward).

Documents (kept as A/B/C during analysis; author key at the end):

- **Document A** — *Federal Republic of Lebanon, Basic Law and Constitutional Pact* (English; Arts. 1–133). Author: Iyad Boustany.
- **Document B** — *Al-Federaliya al-lthnojughraphiya fi Lubnan / Ethno-Geographic Federalism* (Arts. 1–218 + demographic annexes). Author: Eddy Abawat.
- **Document C** — *Proposed Constitution of the Federal Republic of Lebanon* (Arabic; Arts. 1–156+). Author: Selim Zakhour.

Accuracy caveat (stated up front, per the standing instruction to choose honesty over convenience): All article numbers and quotations below come from a full read of the three PDFs, but constitutional PDFs contain drafting glitches and the two Arabic texts were read and translated in-session. Treat specific clause numbers as *reliable but worth spot-checking against the source* before you cite them publicly. Where a document contradicts itself, I have flagged it rather than picked the charitable reading.

PART 0 — The Threat Model, and Why It Sets the Scoring

This report is written to an explicit premise supplied by the reader and stated here so the whole analysis is auditable against it: **Lebanon is not a settled society legislating policy differences, but a field of existential contest among four communities — Sunni, Shia, Druze, Christian — in which control of the central state is sought as the instrument to dominate, displace, or demographically replace the others.** Under that premise a constitution is not graded as a cooperative bargain among trusting partners; it is graded the way one grades a system that must survive a hostile insider — a worst-case, adversarial standard.

That standard reduces to two questions asked of every provision:

- **Is the center a thin coordinator or a fat prize?** A center that holds real power is worth capturing, and whoever captures it can turn it against the others; the fight over it never ends. A thin center removes the object of the contest.
- **Are a community's survival guarantees self-enforcing, or promissory?** A guarantee that depends on the goodwill of whoever holds the center — a charter, a court, an entrenched clause — is only as good as that holder's willingness to honor it. A guarantee the community can enforce itself — its own force, courts, purse, citizenship, demographic control, a veto, an exit — depends on no one's goodwill.

Three structural variables follow and drive the scoring in Part 10: **(1)** the weight of the center (thin beats fat); **(2)** whether each community controls its own **membership and demography** (cantonal citizenship beats national citizenship at a center that controls naturalization and the census); and **(3)** whether protection is **held as power** or **promised as law** (Part 9). Parts 3–5 grade the drafts against a general federalist objective; Part 10 re-grades them against *this* threat model, and the two orderings differ in an instructive way. The analysis is conditional on the premise: if the threat is milder than stated, the weights soften — but the structural findings do not change.

PART 1 — Diagnostic Comparison (the 11 questions)

#	Question	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Q1	How many	4 cantons , one per sect-group (Sunni, Shia, Druze, Christian).	16 cantons + Beirut governorate , drawn by	No fixed number. "States" formed bottom-up : any 3+

#	Question	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
	cantons / how delineated	Borders = aggregation of <i>municipalities</i> , each assigned by sect majority (≥67%, or 51% rule, else split by neighborhood). Non-contiguous. Number 4 entrenched. (Arts. 22–23, 94)	≥55% sectarian majority on electoral rolls ("sectarian homogeneity"), maps annexed. Non-contiguous. Same-sect cantons may merge by local referendum. (Arts. 1, 3, 217)	districts opt in by referendum (Art. 53). Confessional basis (Art. 51). Non-contiguous (Art. 53.2). Map then entrenched against demographic change (Art. 53-bis).
Q2	Layers of power	3: municipality → canton → federal (Summary; Art. 20).	2 constitutional orders (federal + local) + municipalities as admin tier (Art. 3, 4).	4 tiers (municipality → district → state → federation) + confessions as a "communal pillar" + special capital (Arts. 50, 70).
Q3	Bottom-up or top-down in reality	Bottom-up (near-confederal). Residual power at canton (Art. 129.1.r, 120); cantonal law prevails over federal (Arts. 24, 54.2); federal acts touching a canton need its consent (Art. 20.6-7). Fiscal: cantons own the tax base, "each canton raises its own taxes," no federal allocation to cantons (Art. 80), balanced-budget mandate, independent borrowing. Center is fiscally starved.	Bottom-up. Residual at cantons (Art. 198); local law prevails (Art. 12); cantons may suspend federal law (Art. 158); per-canton veto on amendments (Art. 205). Fiscal: tax split 30% municipality / 50% canton / 20% center (Art. 193); central bank sends 2/3 of profit down (Art. 129). ~80% of tax stays below.	Bottom-up in competence & money. Residual at states (Art. 77); state-law priority in shared fields (Art. 77, 60.3). Fiscal: states legislate own taxes (Art. 154.2), own property/consumption bases, borrow; federation takes a carved-out quarter + customs (Art. 155) and redistributes a "fair share" down (Art. 60.4).
Q4	Cantonal citizenship? If not, where	Yes — cantonal citizenship exists and is the primary political membership , tied to sect (Summary; Art. 14). Three tiers: federal <i>nationality</i> (passport), cantonal <i>citizenship</i> (franchise/office), municipal <i>residency</i> . No dual cantonal citizenship.	No cantonal citizenship. Citizenship is national and singular (Art. 18); sub-national membership is by sect + electoral registration, not a status. (Oddity: naturalization delegated to "local law.")	No cantonal citizenship. Citizenship national/federal (Art. 21; exclusive federal power, Art. 72.7). Sub-national identity attaches to confession ("federal communal units," Art. 70), not to a canton.
Q5	How many parliaments	4 cantonal parliaments + 1 federal + municipal councils. But the federal parliament is not separately elected — it is the cantonal MPs sitting together (Art. 27). Single chamber.	2 federal chambers (Council of Cantons 36, indirect; Federal Chamber 100, directly elected) + 16 cantonal + 3 Beirut legislatures + municipal. (Arts. 50, 66, 131)	2 federal chambers (Chamber of Deputies 60, directly, deconfessionalized ; Council of States 128, directly, confessional) + one legislature per state + district councils + municipal. (Arts. 79, 83, 97, 58)
Q6	Where sovereignty (ultimate decision-	The individual canton. "Cantonal sovereignty is the ultimate source" (Art. 18.1); inverted supremacy (cantonal law beats federal); amendment needs unanimity	Split / cantons-as-bloc. Federal Basic-Law supremacy claimed but Art. 12 says local law prevails (contradiction); every canton vetoes	Contested → tilts federal. Art. 1 "single state of full sovereignty" vs Art. 60 "states enjoy sovereignty" (contradiction). Federal-constitutional supremacy

#	Question	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
	maker) lies	of all 4 cantons (Art. 55) → each holds a veto; explicit exit/secession right (Arts. 14.5, 33.2, 114). Inter-canton disputes → international arbitration (Art. 117.6).	constitutional amendment (Art. 205); Federal Constitutional Court arbitrates disputes; no secession (unity clause).	(Art. 16); Federal Supreme Court is apex (Art. 142); entrenched constitution + state veto only over <i>reduction of its own powers</i> (Art. 156.4). No secession (Art. 4).
Q7	Federal (nationwide) elections ?	No. "No elections of deputies at the Federal Level" (Art. 27). Federal executive = the 4 cantonal PMs; federal president rotates by age (Arts. 38–41).	Mixed. Federal Chamber directly elected nationwide (Art. 66); Council of Cantons is delegate (Art. 50); Presidential Council elected by the assembly (Art. 92).	Yes. Both federal chambers directly, popularly elected nationwide (Arts. 83, 98). Federal executive elected indirectly by the upper house (Art. 117).
Q8	Multi-order scaling vs. preset agglomeration (corrected)	Genuinely multi-order. Subsidiarity default at the municipality (smallest unit, Art. 20(8)); the preset intermediate tiers (caza, mohafaza) are abolished (Art. 94); "associations of municipalities" self-govern at no fixed size (Art. 118(4)), so municipalities pool per-project, across cantonal lines , at whatever scale a project needs. Cross-canton arteries are held jointly by the affected cantons under the unanimity council (Art. 111) — shared ownership with a mutual veto, not central capture; Art. 59(2) <i>protects</i> municipalities from federal task-loading (it does not bar voluntary association). No preset container.	Preset. The 16 qadas are fixed by the Basic Law and annexed maps (Arts. 1, 3); agglomeration is poured into a constant sect map, elastic only via same-sect merger (Art. 3).	Preset. The district map is fixed and a 3-district minimum is hard-coded to form a state (Art. 53), then frozen (Art. 53-Ī). The scaling tier is set by the constitution, not by the project — the opposite of multi-order.
Q9	Federal executive : structure & composition	Collegial, unelected, unanimity-bound. The 4 cantonal PMs = the federal government (Art. 38); presidency rotates by age , 1-yr; all decisions unanimous (Art. 39.3). All sects represented → not majority-capturable . Paralysis risk high.	6-member Presidential Council , fixed 3 Christian + 3 Muslim (six named madhhab), elected by the assembly, annual rotating chair , 6-yr non-renewable, consensus-preferred (Arts. 92–96). Not majority-capturable.	6-member Federal Council , fixed 6 confessions , elected by the Council of States, rotating presidency, decisions by consensus or 5-of-6 (Arts. 117–123). Central consociational core. Not majority-capturable.
Q10	Cantonal power: structure &	Full order of government — directly elected cantonal PM + parliament + own courts + own army + own central bank	Full order — own constitution, legislature, executive (governor reserved to majority sect ,	Full order — own constitution, directly elected governor + 9-member council +

#	Question	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
	composition	(Arts. 122, 48.2, 66). Arguably stronger than the center.	Art. 161), judiciary + constitutional court, finance branch (Arts. 130, 160–195).	legislature , own judiciary, own security force (state guard) , taxing power (Arts. 54–60).
Q11	JUDICIARY — (A) per-canton independence vs blended; (B) obedient to cantonal citizens vs supra-positive "moral principles"	(A) Maximal per-canton independence. Each canton has its own constitutional court + courts; cantons appoint even the federal judges (Art. 72); and a cantonal court can OVERRIDE the Federal Constitutional Court by lapse of 90 days (Art. 77.2). Not a unified system. (B) Bound to the cantonal demos. Rights are default-only, overridable by cantonal law (Art. 1); explicit clause barring any person from invoking human rights/the Basic Law to strike down cantonal law (Sec. X.5); exits international law (Art. 99).	(A) Blended, federal apex. Each canton has its own judiciary + local constitutional court and appoints its judges, but the Supreme Federal Constitutional Court can overturn them (Art. 179) and settles all inter-order disputes (Arts. 117–118). (B) Mixed / supra-positive ceiling. An entrenched rights charter binds cantonal law (Art. 6); international charters incorporated; a federal minority Ombudsman court overrides the cantonal majority (Arts. 123–124).	(A) Blended, strong federal supremacy — most centralized of the three. Cantons have courts/constitutional courts, but the Federal Supreme Court reviews all laws, hears appeals from cantonal constitutional courts (Art. 141.7), takes individual rights complaints (141.6), and binds everyone (Art. 142); apex bench appointed federally/confessionally. (B) Bound to supra-positive norms. Entrenched federal rights charter + "principles of democracy" (Art. 2) + incorporated Universal Declaration of Human Rights (preamble) can strike down cantonal enactments.

Stated objectives (extracted, verbatim gist)

- **A:** Lebanon = an aggregation of **four national narratives/sect-groups**; each group **self-governs its own canton under its own laws**; a thin shared "supra-national" shell; the pact is **terminable/exitable**. (Preamble; Art. 17)
- **B:** Manage pluralism by **fair power-sharing, guarantee components against demographic shift**, and **"curb separatist ambitions"** while transferring most competences to the local level. Declares Lebanon **"one, indivisible."** (Preamble; Part One)
- **C:** A **consociational federal republic of confessional communities**, built on **"priority for the lowest authority (subsidiarity)"**, **neutrality**, and commitment to the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights**; **"the people are the source of authority."** (Preamble ٢-أ)

PART 2 — Similarities and Differences

Shared by all three

- All three are **confessional/ethno-territorial** at bottom: the units are defined by sect, not by neutral geography (A explicitly; B by ≥55% rolls; C by "communities on the basis of confessions").
- All three **push residual power and a real tax base downward** — none is a centralized state pretending to be federal on the money-and-competence layer.
- All three build a **consociational, capture-resistant federal executive** (no simple majority can seize it).
- All three make the **canton a genuine order of government** (own constitution/legislature/executive/courts), not an administrative branch.
- All three allow **non-contiguous** units and none locates citizenship at the canton except A.

The sharpest differences

Axis	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Overall type	Confederation of 4 sect-states	Confederal-federal hybrid, 16 units	Consociational federation , preset confessional units
Ultimate decider	The individual canton (veto + exit)	Cantons as a veto-bloc	Federal Supreme Court + entrenched constitution
Federal legitimacy	Delegated (no federal elections)	Partly direct (lower house)	Fully direct (both chambers elected)
Judiciary apex	Cantonal court can beat the federal court	Federal court beats cantonal	Federal court supreme over all
Rights model	Rights subordinate to cantonal will; anti-review clause	Entrenched rights + minority Ombudsman above cantons	Entrenched rights + UDHR above cantons
Citizenship	Cantonal (sect) + national	National only	National only
Fiscal center	Almost none (starved)	Small (20%)	Moderate (¼ + customs, redistributes)
Secession	Permitted	Prohibited	Prohibited

Design philosophy in one line each

- **A** is the purest **self-rule / exit-based** design: four groups that agree to share almost nothing and can walk away — a confederation in all but name, and honest about it.
- **B** is a "**unity in name, separation in wiring**" design: it proclaims one indivisible anti-separatist state but installs cantonal-law supremacy, cantonal nullification, and per-canton amendment vetoes — while topping it with a rights/minority ceiling.
- **C** is a **consociational federation**: sect power-sharing concentrated at an elected center with a supreme rights-guarding court, sitting on top of genuinely devolved competences and finances.

PART 3 — Item-by-Item Scoring (1–10 on two axes)

Coherence = does the mechanism match the document's own claim/intent? (claim bottom-up, wire it bottom-up → high; claim it, wire the opposite → low.) **Effectiveness** = does the wiring actually achieve the *federalist objective set* the brief specifies — genuine bottom-up self-rule, protection of communities, a clear ultimate decider, and (per your Q11) a **per-canton judiciary that answers to the cantonal citizens**? Effectiveness is therefore scored against *that* objective, which is stated so the grade is auditable.

Dimension (weight)	A-Coh	A-Eff	B-Coh	B-Eff	C-Coh	C-Eff
Q1 Delineation (5)	8	8	8	7	8	7
Q2 Layers (4)	8	7	7	7	7	7
Q3 Direction + fiscal reality (12)	7	9	5	8	8	8
Q4 Citizenship locus (5)	8	8	5	6	7	6
Q5 Parliaments (4)	8	7	8	7	8	8
Q6 Sovereignty / ultimate decider (8)	7	7	5	6	6	7
Q7 Federal elections (4)	8	8	7	7	8	8
Q8 Multi-order scaling — elastic vs preset (6)	9	9	5	4	5	4
Q9 Federal executive (10)	7	7	8	8	7	7
Q10 Cantonal power (5)	9	9	7	7	8	8

Q11 Judiciary — per-canton + demos-obedient (20)	7	9	7	5	8	3
Minority/community protection <i>achieved</i> (12)	8	8	5	8	6	8
Internal consistency (5)	6	6	4	4	6	6

Reading the Q11 row (the decisive, highest-weighted line):

- **A** scores highest on *effectiveness against your judicial criterion* (9): each canton's court is genuinely independent, can override the federal court, and the judiciary is explicitly barred from using human-rights/"moral principles" to strike down the cantonal citizens' law. This is exactly the per-canton, demos-obedient model your brief prizes.
- **B** (5): cantons have courts, but a federal constitutional court and a minority Ombudsman sit above and can overturn the cantonal majority on rights grounds.
- **C** (3): the opposite of your criterion — a single Federal Supreme Court reviews all law, hears appeals from cantonal courts, takes individual rights complaints, and enforces the Universal Declaration against cantonal enactments. Internally it is *coherent* (8) and, by conventional rule-of-law standards, arguably the most robust — but measured against *your* stated objective it is the weakest.

PART 4 — Weighted Grades

Weights (stated): Judiciary 20 · Direction+fiscal 12 · Minority protection 12 · Executive 10 · Sovereignty 8 · Scaling 6 · Delineation 5 · Citizenship 5 · Cantonal power 5 · Layers 4 · Parliaments 4 · Federal elections 4 · Internal consistency 5. ($\Sigma = 100$.) Grade = $\Sigma(\text{weight} \times \text{score} \div 10)$.

Document	Weighted Coherence	Weighted Effectiveness (vs. the federalist objective)	Combined	Letter
A — Boustany	75	81	78	B+
C — Zakhour	71	63	67	C+
B — Abawat	62	65	63.5	C

(Arithmetic is the weighted sum of the Part 3 columns; the two Arabic-text grades carry slightly more measurement uncertainty than the English Document A.)

PART 5 — Final Ranking and Verdict

Overall ranking (against the brief's objective set)

1. **Document A — Boustany**
2. **Document C — Zakhour**
3. **Document B — Abawat**

Ranking on coherence alone

1. **A (75)** — says confederal self-rule, delivers confederal self-rule.
2. **C (71)** — an internally consistent consociational-federal machine; its main gap is branding "subsidiarity" while centralizing the executive and the courts.
3. **B (62)** — the largest claim-reality inversion: proclaims an indivisible, separatism-curbing state while wiring cantonal-law supremacy, nullification and exit-shaped vetoes.

Ranking on effectiveness alone (vs. the stated federalist objective)

1. **A (81)** — because the two heaviest criteria (a per-canton, demos-obedient judiciary and genuine bottom-up fiscal/residual power) are maximized here.

2. **B (65) › C (63)** — B protects intra-canton minorities better and keeps more at the sect level; C has real elections and a clearer apex — but both invert your judicial criterion by placing a supra-positive court above the cantons, and (corrected here) neither is the multi-order one.

Why the orders differ

On **coherence**, C edges out B and nearly ties A because C is honest about being a consociational federation. On **effectiveness against your objective**, A pulls clearly ahead because your rubric puts 20% weight on a judiciary that is per-canton-independent and bound to the cantonal citizens rather than to "moral principles" — the exact axis on which A is strongest and C is weakest.

Per-document verdict

A — Boustany. *Greatest strength:* the most genuinely bottom-up design — sovereignty, tax base, courts, and even armies sit at the canton, and the judiciary answers to the cantonal citizens with an explicit bar on rights-based override; it is also the only genuinely **multi-order** design (subsidiarity at the municipality, no preset tiers). *Most damaging incoherence (which is enunciation of principles on the one hand versus reality):* the fiscal double-bind (Art. 80 forbids downward transfers while Arts. 83/85 authorize them) and the supremacy tension (preamble asserts Basic-Law primacy while Art. 24 gives cantonal law the last word), plus a bill of rights declared in Arts. 1–16 and disabled in Sec. X.5. *One change with the highest payoff:* resolve the fiscal contradiction and rename the federal tier honestly (it is a confederal council, not a "federation"), so the text stops asserting a central supremacy it then negates. *What it actually is beneath its vocabulary:* **a confederation of four sovereign sect-states with a thin, exitable shared shell.**

C — Zakhour. *Greatest strength:* the most complete and workable machine — fully elected bicameral center, clear apex court, entrenched rights, and real cantonal orders with their own security and taxing power (its public-goods scaling, however, is **preset**, not multi-order — corrected from an earlier draft). *Most damaging incoherence:* it brands itself on subsidiarity/"lowest authority first" while concentrating the commanding heights (a fixed six-confession executive and a supreme rights-guarding federal court) at the center — and Art. 1 ("single state of full sovereignty") flatly contradicts Art. 60 ("states enjoy sovereignty"). *One change with the highest payoff:* pick a lane on sovereignty and on the judiciary — either let cantonal courts be final on cantonal law, or drop the subsidiarity branding. *What it actually is:* **a consociational federation with a strong, rights-supreme center sitting on devolved competences.**

B — Abawat. *Greatest strength:* the most empirically grounded delineation (16 units mapped to real ≥55% sectarian data) and the most explicit intra-canton **minority protection** (the Ombudsman court and minority-tradition guarantees actually reach individuals a cantonal majority might harm). *Most damaging incoherence:* it promises **unity and the curbing of separatism** while wiring the most separation-entrenching machinery of the three — cantonal-law supremacy (Art. 12), cantonal power to suspend federal law (Art. 158), per-canton amendment vetoes (Art. 205), and same-sect merger rights — then tops it with a rights ceiling that contradicts its own subsidiarity claims. *One change with the highest payoff:* reconcile Art. 12 (local law prevails) with the Basic-Law-supremacy clause, and align the stated anti-separatist objective with the actual (confederal) wiring — or change the objective. *What it actually is:* **a confederal, separation-entrenching order marketed as an indivisible unitary-federal state.**

PART 6 — The Territorial Unit: What "Canton" Means, How It Is Drawn, and How Much Power It Holds

Standing terminology convention (applies everywhere the word "canton" appears in this report). The three drafts do not use the same word or the same concept for their sub-national unit. Throughout, "canton" is a generic placeholder; its real meaning in each project is fixed here and should be read into every later mention.

	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
The unit is called	Canton (a.k.a. Region)	Qada ("district")	Wilaya ("state")
How many	Exactly 4 (entrenched)	16 qadas + Beirut (3 sect-districts)	No fixed number — emerges from opt-in;

	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
			districts are the fixed skeleton
What defines it	One sect-group (Sunni, Shia, Druze, Christian)	A ≥55% sectarian majority of registered voters	A confessional cluster of ≥3 districts
Delineated by	Aggregating municipalities by the sect of their <i>original</i> voters (Art. 22(5))	Drawing borders to reach ≥55% "sectarian homogeneity" on the electoral rolls (Art. 1)	3+ districts opting in by referendum on a confessional basis (Arts. 51, 53)
Contiguous?	No — sect patchwork (Art. 22(4))	No (Art. 1)	No (Art. 53, Second)
One-line meaning	A portable sect-nation with its own citizenship	A sect-homogeneous administrative district of the one national state	A confessional self-governing state that crystallizes bottom-up, then freezes

6a. The delineation criterion, precisely

A — Boustany (4 sect-cantons). A municipality joins a group's canton where that group's *original* (pre-reform) voters **exceed 67%** (Art. 22(5)(b)); or **exceed 51%** while the residual 49% is fragmented among several other groups (Art. 22(5)(c)); genuinely mixed municipalities are **dismembered neighborhood-by-neighborhood**, each fragment reassigned to the "correct" sect-canton (Art. 22(5)(d)). Beirut is split into a Christian and a Sunni municipality on the same logic (Art. 95(2)). The criterion is therefore **sect, operationalized through the municipal voter register** — geography is only the medium.

B — Abawat (16 qadas + Beirut). Each qada is drawn to contain a **single sectarian majority of at least 55% of registered voters**, on a stated principle of "sectarian homogeneity" (Art. 1); the annexed maps and per-qada sect tables (declared "an integral part of this Basic Law") evidence the result, from Zahle at 57.98% Christian to Bilad Jbeil at 96.3%. The criterion is **sect-by-registration-percentage on a fixed, annexed map**.

C — Zakhour (opt-in wilayat). The constitution fixes the **district** map and lets **any 3+ districts form a state by referendum** (majority of residents in each district), **on a confessional basis** (Arts. 51, 53), with non-contiguity permitted. After formation the map **locks** (Art. 53-İ): demographic change alone cannot redraw it, and any later change needs an unbreakable ⅔ host-state veto + a 15-year bar + a Supreme-Court demographic-neutrality ruling. The criterion is **confessional opt-in, then entrenchment**.

6b. How much power vests in the unit

All three vest heavy power in the unit, but in descending order of unit-supremacy:

Power lever	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Residual power	Canton (Art. 129(1)(r), 120, 50(1))	Qada (Arts. 198, 152)	State (Art. 77)
Whose law wins on conflict	Cantonal (Arts. 24, 52(2), 54(2), 77(1))	Local (Art. 12); qada may suspend federal law (Art. 158)	Federal (Art. 16); state may vary <i>application</i> of federal law outside exclusive fields (Art. 60(3))
Own tax base	Yes; center barred from funding cantons (Arts. 80–82)	Yes; keeps 80% of tax (Art. 193)	Yes; union takes ¼ + customs (Arts. 154–155)
Own courts / constitutional court	Yes, and final over the federal court (Art. 77)	Yes, but federal court overturns (Art. 179)	Yes, but federal court supreme (Art. 142)

Power lever	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Own armed/security force	Own army (Art. 48(2))	Own police (Art. 172)	Own state guard/police (Art. 60(6))
Own constitution	Implied (Arts. 118(1), 131–132)	Yes (Arts. 2, 130)	Yes (Art. 54)
Net	Unit > center (confederal)	Unit ≈ center, unit-supremacist on ordinary law	Unit strong, but under a supreme federal roof

So the unit holds the *most* real power in **A** (it is sovereign and its law and courts beat the center), a very large but rights-capped power in **B**, and a genuine-but-subordinate power in **C**.

PART 7 — Membership and the Local Demos: Citizenship, the Electoral College, and How "Collective Will" Emerges

This is the pivot of the whole comparison, because only one of the three creates a **citizenship of the unit**. Where there is none, the unit's "will" is really the will of an *electorate* defined some other way — and that distinction decides how robust the unit's claim to self-rule actually is.

7a. Is there cantonal citizenship — and if not, who is the local demos?

A — Boustany: YES, a distinct cantonal citizenship, and it is portable by sect. A "Cantonal Citizen is a person belonging to the Ethno-Cultural Group of his/her canton **irrespective of his/her Municipal Residency**" (front matter; Art. 14). It is a real legal status: cantons grant and can strip it, no dual cantonal citizenship is allowed (Art. 14(2)–(3)), and it carries equal political rights within the canton (Art. 121). The **electoral college for the cantonal parliament and the cantonal Prime Minister is exactly the body of Cantonal Citizens** — "The electoral college being the Cantonal Citizens" (Art. 28b(2)); the PM is chosen by "the same Electoral College ... i.e., the Cantonal Citizens" (Art. 122(1)). Municipal elections, by contrast, run on **residency** (any resident national votes — Art. 118(2)), though only Cantonal Citizens of that canton may *stand* for municipal office (Art. 118(3)). **Collective will** is constitutionally defined: "All Cantonal authority is derived from the Cantonal Citizens" (Art. 17(2)); "Sovereignty is derived from the collective will expressed by Cantonal Citizens" (Art. 18(2)). → A has a genuine, bounded **sect-demos**, and it is the same wherever its members physically live.

B — Abawat: NO cantonal citizenship. The local demos is the sectarian electoral roll. Citizenship is national and singular — "Lebanese nationality ... is the basis of his citizenship" (Art. 18). Membership in a qada is not a status but a **registration**: the local Legislative Council is elected "within the sectarian roll (al-qayd al-ta'ifi)," one member per 20,000 registered voters, with **one seat reserved for minorities** (Arts. 131–132); the Governor is elected by the qada's registered voters and **must be of the majority sect** (Arts. 160–161); the federal senate (Council of Qadas) is chosen indirectly by an **electoral college of the qada's legislators + municipal councillors** (Art. 50). So the "collective will" of a qada is the will of **the sect-registered voters attached to that qada** — a demos defined by the confessional roll, not by any cantonal citizenship, and internally muddled (Art. 50 calls the senate election both "direct universal suffrage" and an electoral-college vote — a self-contradiction).

C — Zakhour: NO state citizenship. The local demos is the resident-registered electorate. Citizenship is national/federal only — "Lebanese nationality ... is the basis of his citizenship" (Art. 21); nationality is an exclusive federal power (Art. 72(7)); confessions, not states, are recognized as "**federal communal units**" (Art. 70). The state's organs are elected by **the registered voters resident in the state** — the Governor and six of nine council members directly (Art. 56), and the State Chamber of Deputies by proportional vote of the state's registered voters (Art. 58). The federal lower house is elected **outside sectarian registration** entirely (Art. 83). So a state's "collective will" is the will of **whoever is registered to vote there by residence** — a conventional territorial demos, fenced by strong anti-resettlement rules (property may not be acquired "for purposes of changing the demographic composition," Art. 26(Third-b); Arts. 21(5), 53–59, 1) so that the residential demos stays sect-stable over time.

7b. How can a unit make decisions and form a "collective will" without cantonal citizenship?

The honest answer, and a real analytical point in favor of A's architecture on its own terms:

- In **A**, the unit's will is watertight: there is a defined set of persons (the Cantonal Citizens) who are the canton, so "the canton decides" has a precise referent, and it does not change if people move.
- In **B and C**, "the canton decides" reduces to "**the subset of national citizens currently registered to vote in this unit decides**." The unit has no members of its own — it has an *electorate on loan* from the national citizenry. B fixes that electorate by **sect-roll** (so it stays confessional but is not a citizenship); C fixes it by **residence + anti-resettlement locks** (so it stays territorial and sect-stable, but again is not a citizenship). Both can generate a local collective will through elections, but that will is **derivative of national citizenship**, not an autonomous cantonal sovereignty. This is why B's and C's cantons, whatever their powers, have a weaker *ontological* claim to be sovereign demoi than A's — a point that matters directly to your sovereignty (Q6) analysis: a unit without its own citizens is exercising delegated electoral authority, not holding sovereignty in the fullest sense.

7c. Citizenship as the demographic-replacement lever (the threat-model reading)

Under the Part 0 premise, citizenship stops being a franchise technicality and becomes the **master variable of survival**, because the instruments of demographic replacement — naturalization, residence, the census, land acquisition — are exactly the powers that "who is a citizen, and who decides" controls.

- **B and C place every one of those levers at the center.** C makes nationality and naturalization an **exclusive federal power** (Art. 72(7)) and the census a federal power (Art. 72(9)); B keeps citizenship national and singular (Art. 18). So a community's demographic survival depends on the center not being captured and turned into a naturalization-and-settlement engine — and control of the census is also control of the parity ratio (Part 8B). Their answer is anti-demographic-engineering clauses and personal-status autonomy (C: Arts. 21(5), 26(Third-b), 53-5-69, 1). But those are **law**, enforced by the center and its court — and demographic replacement is the one harm that is **irreversible**, exactly where a promissory guarantee is weakest (the Turkey case, Part 9).
- **A makes demographic survival self-enforcing.** Cantonal citizenship means each community controls its own membership and naturalization (Art. 14(3)), its own residency (Art. 129(1)(b)), its own land and building permits (Art. 129(1)(p)), and reserves municipal office to cantonal citizens (Art. 118(3)). No central actor can naturalize outsiders into a canton or settle a replacing population, because the center holds none of those powers. A demographic breach is a codified **red line with a self-help remedy**: Arts. 14(4)–(5) make demographic imbalance a ground to terminate the pact or exit (Art. 114). "You cannot replace us" is thereby converted from a hope into a capability.

This is why, under the stated premise, cantonal citizenship is the single most consequential feature in the entire comparison, and B's and C's national citizenship is their deepest structural vulnerability — deeper than the judiciary or the fisc, because replacement is the endgame the whole design exists to prevent.

PART 8 — Rights Across Units, the Non-Majority Individual, and the "Home Canton" Test

8a. Are rights differentiated between one unit and another?

A — Boustany: YES, sharply. The bill of rights (Arts. 1–16) applies only "**insofar as the Cantonal laws do not state otherwise**" (Art. 1); its limits are "as decided by Cantonal Parliaments" (Art. 5(8)); a group's creed is protected "**even when ... it infringes on another Group's rights**" (Art. 4(1)); and no one "can invoke ... any human right ... to modify ... any [cantonal] law" (Section X(5)). Rights are therefore **whatever each canton legislates** — maximally differentiated across the four.

B — Abawat: PARTLY. A uniform federal charter binds every qada — "neither legislature may enact laws contradicting the fundamental rights and freedoms in this Basic Law" (Art. 6) — and personal-status law is community-specific (Art. 123). So the **rights floor is common**, but its application and personal-status content differ by community. Moderate differentiation.

C — Zakhour: LARGELY UNIFORM. "No law may contradict the principles of democracy [or] the rights and fundamental freedoms in this constitution" (Art. 2); the federal constitution voids any conflicting state law (Art. 16); any person may bring a rights complaint to the Federal Supreme Court (Art. 141(6)); the UDHR is embraced in the preamble. Only personal status is pluralist, with an **optional civil track** (Art. 44). Rights are essentially the **same in every state**.

8b. The non-majority individual — his rights and obligations where he is **not** the majority

This is the decisive test you posed. Take a person of sect S residing in a unit where sect S is not the majority.

	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Obligation where he is a minority	Bound by the host canton's law; that law may lawfully override his rights and even his beliefs (Arts. 1, 4(1))	Bound by " the majority laws therein " (Art. 45)	Bound by state law, but state law cannot breach the uniform federal rights floor (Arts. 2, 16)
His protection there	Thin — no reserved seat, no minority tribunal, no rights-based challenge (Sec. X(5)); he votes only in <i>municipal</i> elections and cannot stand for municipal office (Art. 118(3))	Moderate but contradicted — personal-status shield (Art. 123), a federal Ombudsman court in every qada (Art. 124), a reserved minority council seat (Art. 132) — yet Art. 45 subjects him to majority law (self-contradiction)	Strongest — a full, equal voter in the state (Art. 58), enforceable rights against the local majority, individual complaint to the Federal Supreme Court (Art. 141(6))
Does he have another unit that is "his own," with full rights?	YES — unambiguously. His cantonal citizenship follows his sect , not his address: he is always a full Cantonal Citizen of sect S's canton, voting for its parliament and PM wherever he lives (Arts. 14, 28b(2), 122(1))	Partly — via the sect-roll he belongs to sect S's qada(s), where S is the majority and supplies the Governor (Art. 161); but "his own" is a registration, not a citizenship , and resident-minority voting is left ambiguous (Arts. 132–133)	No — by design. Citizenship is national, rights are uniform, belonging is by residence; he has equal rights everywhere rather than fuller rights in a home-state

Reading it plainly:

- **A resolves your question in the affirmative and is the only draft that does so cleanly.** Its theory is that no one is *really* a permanent minority, because political identity lives in the sect-canton, not the place of residence — a Christian in the Shia canton is a resident there but a full **citizen** of the Christian canton, which is "his own." The price is equally plain and must be stated: **where he actually lives as a minority, his protection is weak** (his rights are defeasible by the host canton and cannot be judicially enforced), which pressures people toward their own canton and tends toward sorting/segregation. A's answer to "is he protected as a minority?" is essentially "he shouldn't need to be — he has his own canton."
- **B tries to give him both a home and in-situ protection, and contradicts itself doing so.** Arts. 123–124 protect the resident-minority from the majority; Art. 45 subjects him to the majority. Both cannot be true; a court would have to pick, and the text does not say which wins.
- **C protects him best where he stands but denies him a "home canton" in your sense.** He is an equal citizen everywhere with the strongest enforceable rights, but there is no unit that is constitutionally "more his

own" than any other. That is a strength under a liberal-equality lens and a weakness under your sect-federal lens — the same fact, scored oppositely depending on the objective.

8c. Scoring the unit / citizenship / rights dimensions

Two-axis scoring as before (1–10). **Effectiveness is measured against the stated sect-federal objective** — genuine unit self-rule, a defined cantonal demos, and a guaranteed "home canton" with full rights — so a design that instead delivers uniform national rights scores *low here even where it is admirable on liberal grounds* (that trade-off is made explicit, not hidden).

Dimension (weight)	A-Coh	A-Eff	B-Coh	B-Eff	C-Coh	C-Eff
D1 Delineation criterion — principled & self-consistent (15)	8	8	8	7	7	7
D2 Power vested in the unit (20)	8	9	6	8	7	7
D3 Strength of the local demos / cantonal citizenship (20)	8	9	5	6	7	5
D4 "Home canton" guarantee + rights differentiation (25)	8	9	6	6	7	3
D5 Protection of the resident non-majority individual (20)	6	4	4	7	7	8
Weighted grade (0–100)	76	78	57	67	70	58

Mini-ranking on these dimensions

- *Effectiveness against the sect-federal objective: A (78) › B (67) › C (58).*
- *Coherence (claim vs. mechanism): A (76) › C (70) › B (57).*
- *Single sub-axis where the order flips — protecting the resident minority (D5): C (8) › B (7) › A (4).*

What this adds to the overall verdict. These dimensions **reinforce the Part 5 ranking (A ► C ► B)** and sharpen *why*: A is first because it is the only draft that supplies a genuine cantonal citizenship and therefore a watertight "home canton" — precisely the feature your question targets — and it does so coherently. B falls to third here because it promises the minority both subjection to and protection from the local majority in the same text (Art. 45 vs. Arts. 123–124). C sits second: the most internally coherent and by far the most protective of the individual minority, but it deliberately declines to grant a differentiated home-canton, so it scores low against the *sect-federal* objective even as it would score highest against a *liberal-equality* objective. The one place the ranking inverts — resident-minority protection — is exactly the cost side of A's model, and it is shown rather than buried.

PART 8B — Parity at the Center: 50/50 Against a One-Third Reality

Both B and C hard-wire **Muslim–Christian parity** into central institutions: B makes its **only popularly-elected** federal chamber 50/50 ("parity between Christians and Muslims," Art. 66) and its executive 3+3 (Art. 92); C splits the 128-seat upper house half/half (Art. 97), the six-member executive 3 "Christian" / 3 "Muslim" (Art. 118, with the Druze filed under "Muslim"), and the supreme court 10 half/half (Art. 140) — though C's 60-seat lower house is population-based and deconfessionalized (Art. 83). **A has no parity clause, because it has no central legislature or executive to apportion.**

On the common estimates Christians are roughly a third of the population (no census since 1932, so figures are contested). Parity therefore sets a **~50% share against a ~33% reality**, and three problems follow, in ascending seriousness:

- **It is a demographic fiction that becomes a permanent *casus belli*.** A frozen over-representation of a shrinking share is the 1943 formula's descendant (6:5, then Taif's 5:5); it did not settle 1943–75, it detonated, and rebuilding it rebuilds the fuse — it must be defended against demographic reality indefinitely.
- **The binary mis-models a four-way conflict.** "Muslim vs Christian" is a two-camp picture; the threat model has four communities, and the Sunni–Shia and Druze cleavages are as live as the confessional one. Parity lumps Sunni + Shia + Druze into one "half" none of them controls — and C even classes the Druze as

"Muslim," which the Druze themselves contest — so it protects "Christians" as a bloc while giving the three other communities no individual guarantee.

- **Parity sits on top of a fat center — the real indictment.** Consociational parity is a device for *sharing a central prize*. Sharing it by a false, binary, frozen formula does not remove the incentive to capture the center; it sets contested quotas for it, and the quotas — who counts as what, who controls the census, who breaks ties — become the battlefield. Because B's chamber legislates and C's Federal Council and Supreme Court hold the commanding heights, the formula guards a prize still worth fighting for. **A has no parity because it dissolves the prize** — the center is a thin four-member unanimity council and power lives in the cantons. Between the two parity drafts, **B is the worse** on this axis (its *sole elected* federal chamber is the parity one), while C at least routes majoritarian weight through a population-based lower house.

The honest qualifier, kept because it is logic and not ideology: over-representing a threatened minority is a legitimate, sometimes stabilizing tool *in itself*. The defect here is doing it (i) through a binary that erases the real cleavage and (ii) at a center fat enough that controlling it stays existential. Thin the center and parity would barely matter; because the center is not thin in B and C, parity is a fault line — and a large part of why both fall below A under the threat-model scoring in Part 10.

PART 9 — Protection by Law vs. Protection by Its Own Power (the enforceability test)

9a. Why this distinction decides everything

A minority protection is worth only what it is worth *the day the majority no longer wishes to honor it*. Two fundamentally different kinds of protection are on offer across these drafts:

- **Protection by law (parchment).** A rights charter, an independent court, an entrenched clause. This is a *promise*: it holds only so long as (i) the majority does not amend or repeal it, (ii) courts stay independent and willing to rule against the majority, and (iii) some body actually enforces the ruling. James Madison called such guarantees "parchment barriers" and warned they do not, by themselves, stop a determined majority (Federalist No. 48). (*This attribution is verifiable; quoted from memory — worth a check before public use.*)
- **Protection by its own power (self-enforcing).** The group holds its own territory, courts, purse, citizenship, coercive force, a veto over any change to the deal, and an exit option. It does not depend on the majority's goodwill, because the group can defend itself or withdraw. This is a *capability*, not a promise.

The historical case you raise is the sharpest illustration. In the early 1910s, Christians (Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians) were on the order of **a fifth of Anatolia's population**; after the **1915 Armenian Genocide**, the **1923 Greek–Turkish population exchange**, and later measures under the secular republic — the **1942 Varlık Vergisi** capital levy that fell disproportionately on non-Muslims, the **1955 Istanbul pogrom**, and the **1964 expulsion of Greek nationals** — Christians today are estimated at **well under 0.2%** of Turkey. (*These are well-documented events; the exact percentages vary by source and much of the collapse coincided with or preceded the 1923 founding — treat the figures as approximate and verify before citing.*) The republic's *formal legal equality* did not save them, because the protected communities held **no autonomous power** and the majority controlled both the law and its enforcement. The lesson — and it is analytically sound — is that **parchment without power is unreliable for a vulnerable minority**.

9b. What actually protects each sect when the majority "won't play by the law"

Mechanism when the majority defects	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Own coercive force	Own army per canton (Art. 48(2))	Own police , but no army (Art. 10)	Own state guard/police (Art. 60(6)), no army
Can the majority legally change the deal against it?	No — every canton holds a unanimity veto on amendment (Art. 55)	No — every qada holds an amendment veto (Art. 205)	Only partly — a state vetoes cuts to <i>its own</i> powers (Art. 156(4)) and

Mechanism when the majority defects	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
			rights are doubly entrenched (Art. 156(2)), but the center and the federal court control interpretation
Can it walk away?	Yes — explicit exit/secession (Arts. 14(5), 33(2), 114)	No — unity clause; secession barred	No — territory inviolable (Art. 4)
Who has the last judicial word on its own law?	Its own court (Art. 77)	Federal court overturns it (Art. 179)	Federal court is supreme (Art. 142)
Fiscal / citizenship self-sufficiency	Own taxes + own citizenship (Arts. 82, 14)	Own taxes; national citizenship	Own taxes; national citizenship
Dominant protection mode	Power (self-enforcing)	Mixed — structural veto + police, but a law-dependent apex	Law (parchment) + entrenchment + anti-demographic clauses

The one place **C** answers the Turkey worry most directly is textual: it **forbids acquiring property in order to change a unit's demographic composition** (Arts. 26(Third-b), 53-5-69, 1) and voids any such measure — a clause aimed squarely at demographic replacement. But it is still enforced *by the federal court*: if the center is captured, the clause is only as strong as the captured court. That is the entire difference between law and power in one provision.

9c. Ranking — robustness when the majority defects

Scored on **self-enforcing (power) protection** — how well each sect is protected if the majority tries to rewrite or simply ignore the law (1 = pure parchment, 10 = fully self-enforcing):

Dimension (weight)	A	B	C
Own coercive force (20)	9	5	5
Veto over changing the deal (25)	9	8	6
Exit option (15)	9	2	2
Judicial finality in its own hands (20)	9	4	3
Fiscal + citizenship self-sufficiency (20)	9	6	6
Self-enforcing-protection score (0–100)	90	53	46

- **Protection by its own power (robust against a defecting majority): A (90) >> B (53) > C (46).**
- **Reliance on protection-by-law (parchment):** the mirror image — **C > B > A**. C's minority is the most dependent on the center continuing to honor the charter; A's is the least.

C's architecture is, structurally, the closest of the three to the model that failed in your Turkey example — a strong central state, uniform court-enforced rights, and no power in minority hands — which is why, on *this specific test*, it is the most exposed. A is the furthest from it.

9d. The honest counter-side

Protection-by-power is more robust than parchment, but two real qualifications belong on the record — stated as mechanism, not as a verdict on "federalism."

The first is a causal correction that cuts in this design's favor. It is tempting to file Lebanon 1975 under "federalism is dangerous," but the 1975 state was the *opposite* of this design: a single army and a centralized confessional pact that fixed power shares to a 1932 census and lodged the commanding heights at a center one bloc had to control. That structure did not merely fail to prevent the war; it manufactured the pressure — when all power sits at the

center and the shares cannot update to demographic change, capturing the center becomes existential and there is no lower level to which a losing group can retreat, while an army seen as one bloc's instrument cannot hold the ring and instead fractures. A genuine self-rule design attacks exactly that mechanism: it lowers the stakes of central capture and gives each group somewhere to stand if it loses the top. Read for its mechanism rather than its label, 1975 is an argument *for* devolving power, not against it.

The second qualification is the actual residual risk, and it is an engineering problem, not an ideological one. A self-enforcing design trades dependence on the majority's goodwill for dependence on the **credibility and completeness of two things**: the balance of force among units, and the exit. Where those are specified, the arrangement is self-stabilizing — Switzerland, a multi-confessional federation with a historically cantonal military tradition and cantonal sovereignty, is the standing proof that it can be. Where they are left undefined, the seams become the flashpoints: non-contiguous sect-cantons, a mixed capital like Beirut, and the unwritten choreography of a lawful exit — how the army, the federal assets, the resource revenue, and the mixed districts are divided the day a canton invokes Art. 114. This design should therefore *specify* the exit and the force-balance in detail rather than leave them implicit; that is where its stability is won or lost. (Separately, and already noted in Part 8: protection-by-power secures the *group*, not the individual minority inside a canton — a distinct limitation, not a reason to prefer parchment.)

Net: on the exact test posed — will the protection survive a majority that stops playing by the law — **A's protection-by-power is the most robust and C's protection-by-law the most exposed, with B in between.** That ordering mirrors the *resident-individual* protection ordering in Part 8, which is the deepest trade-off in the design space: **power protects the group against the majority; law protects the individual against the group — and none of the three drafts secures both at once.**

PART 10 — Final Scoring Under the Threat Model

Parts 3–5 graded the drafts against a general federalist objective. This section re-grades them against the **Part 0 threat model** — an existential contest in which the center is a weapon and survival guarantees must be self-enforcing. Each dimension is scored 0–10 for **fit to that threat model**; weights reflect what the premise makes decisive.

Dimension (weight)	A	B	C
Thin center / no capturable prize (16)	9	5	3
Cantonal citizenship = self-controlled demography (18)	9	3	3
Self-enforcing protection — force / courts / veto / exit (18)	9	5	4
Judiciary per-canton + demos-obedient (12)	9	5	3
Multi-order / no preset demographic map (8)	9	3	3
Central apportionment realism — no fictional parity (8)	9	3	4
Fiscal self-sufficiency (8)	9	7	7
Exit as ultimate demographic backstop (6)	9	2	2
Internal coherence (claim vs wiring) (6)	7	4	6
Threat-model fit (0–100)	89	42	37

Ranking under the threat model: A (89) >> B (42) > C (37).

Note the **B/C inversion** relative to the federalist lens (where the order was A ▶ C ▶ B). It is not noise; it is the point of stating the premise. Under a general federalist / rule-of-law objective, C's completeness — full elections, a clear apex court, entrenched rights — earns second place. Under the *existential-threat* objective those same features are liabilities: C has the **fattest center**, the most **centralized citizenship and census control** (Arts. 72(7), 72(9)), the most **law-based (captureable) minority protection**, and a **supreme federal court** over the cantons — precisely the configuration that failed in the Turkey case. B, for all its incoherence, keeps more at the sect level (sixteen sect-homogeneous units with local-law supremacy, own police, a per-qada amendment veto), so it is a marginally better fit for communities whose overriding priority is not being dominated from the center. A dominates on every decisive axis because it removes the central prize and makes each community's survival self-enforcing.

This does not erase A's real costs (Parts 8, 9d): it protects the group more than the individual inside a canton, its cross-canton exit choreography is under-specified, and — corrected in this draft — its multi-order scaling works because nothing prohibits it rather than because an affirmative clause guarantees it. On the premise you have set, those are refinements to the best-fitting architecture, not reasons to prefer either alternative.

A necessary integrity note on the scoring frame

Two things a truth-first reading owes you, independent of who wrote which draft:

1. **The scoring frame is explicit, and Document A fits it — by mechanism, not merely by construction.** The federalist rubric (Parts 3–5) already rewards per-canton judicial independence and bottom-up power, which A embodies; one could dismiss that as a test built to A's shape. But once the **threat model is stated openly (Part 0)**, A's lead stops being a rubric artifact and becomes a structural fact: a thin center and self-enforcing, demographically-sovereign communities are the configuration that best survives an existential inter-communal contest, and A is the only draft that supplies them. The result remains *conditional on the premise* — that Lebanon is such a contest — which is the reader's to assert, not mine.
2. **By conventional constitutional-design standards, the ranking is contestable.** On workability, stability, democratic legitimacy, and protection of minorities *within* each canton, Document C is arguably the strongest and Document A the riskiest: A's unanimity rule invites paralysis, its exit rights invite fragmentation, its starved center may be unable to act, and — because rights are subordinated to the cantonal majority with judicial review switched off — an individual or a small minority *inside* a canton has little protection against that canton's majority. Whether that is a feature (maximal self-rule) or a flaw (unprotected minorities) depends on the value you are optimizing for. The scores above optimize for the value your brief specified; a reader who weights minority-rights-via-independent-courts would rank C first. Both results are shown so the choice of frame stays visible and yours to make.

APPENDIX — Side-by-Side Article Citations

A theme-by-theme index of the exact provisions each finding rests on. Article numbers are as printed in each source (Arabic articles translated; sub-clauses in parentheses). "—" = the document is silent or has no direct counterpart.

1. Territorial units and delineation

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Number / creation of units	Arts. 22(2), 94 (four cantons)	Art. 1 (16 qada + Beirut)	Arts. 50, 53 (states formed by 3+ districts)
Delineation criterion	Art. 22(3)–(5) (sect via municipalities)	Art. 1 (≥55% sect on rolls)	Arts. 51, 53 (confessional basis)
Non-contiguity allowed	Art. 22(4)	Art. 1	Art. 53(2)
Boundary change / merger / split	Arts. 22(6), 23(2)–(3), 55	Arts. 3, 217 (same-sect merger)	Art. 53-bis (entrenched; gated reform)
Capital carve-out	Arts. 19(1), 95 (Beirut)	Art. 1 (Beirut, 3 districts)	Art. 68(3) (capital, no state)

2. Layers and competences

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Layers of government	Art. 20; Summary (3)	Arts. 3, 4 (2 orders + municipal)	Arts. 50, 70 (4 tiers + confessions)
Federal exclusive powers	Art. 53	Art. 196	Arts. 71, 72, 154(1)
Concurrent / shared powers	Art. 54	Art. 197	Art. 76
Cantonal / local powers	Art. 129	Arts. 152, 198	Arts. 57, 60, 65
Municipal powers	Arts. 117–118	Arts. 3 (municipal tier)	Arts. 69-a to 69-w

3. Direction of power — residual, override, fiscal

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Residual power sits at	Arts. 129(1)(r), 120, 50(1) (canton)	Arts. 198, 152 (canton)	Arts. 77, 60(1) (states)
Which law prevails on conflict	Arts. 24, 52(2), 54(2) (cantonal)	Art. 12 (local) — vs Art. 2/50 (Basic-Law precedence)	Art. 16 (federal supremacy)
Lower tier can suspend/block upper	Arts. 20(6)–(7), 20(4), 25(2)	Arts. 158, 5, 159	Arts. 60(3), 156(4)
Upper-tier compulsion of lower	Art. 26 (needs unanimity)	Art. 201 (on canton request)	Art. 141 (via Federal Supreme Court)
Tax base ownership	Arts. 80, 81, 82, 84	Arts. 192, 193, 194	Arts. 154, 155
Vertical transfers / revenue split	Arts. 83, 85 (exceptional) vs 80(2), 101(5) (barred)	Art. 193 (30/50/20); Art. 129 (2/3 CB profit down)	Arts. 60(4), 155 (¼ up + "fair share" down)
Natural-resource revenue	Art. 115(1)	Art. 197 (joint)	Arts. 73, 74 (≥50% to producing unit)
Independent borrowing	Arts. 89(2), 92(1)	Art. 191 (federal); cantonal silent	Arts. 69-b(2), 69-b(4) (municipal loans)

4. Citizenship

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Cantonal citizenship	Art. 14; Summary (exists, sect-based)	— (none)	— (none)
National citizenship	Art. 14(1) (nationality layer)	Art. 18 (singular)	Art. 21
Who controls naturalization	Art. 14(3) (canton)	Art. 18 ("local law")	Art. 72(7) (exclusive federal)
Sub-national membership unit	Canton (sect)	Sect + electoral roll	Art. 70 (confessions as units)

5. Legislatures

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Federal chamber(s)	Arts. 27, 30, 31 (composite, unelected)	Arts. 50 (Council of Cantons), 66 (Federal Chamber)	Arts. 79, 83 (Chamber), 97–98 (Council of States)
Cantonal legislatures	Arts. 28a, 29	Art. 131	Art. 58
Municipal / district councils	Art. 118	Art. 3	Arts. 63–65, 69-b
Direct vs delegate federal seats	Art. 27 (all delegate)	Art. 66 direct / Art. 50 delegate	Arts. 83, 98 (both direct)

6. Sovereignty, amendment, secession

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Sovereignty locus (text)	Art. 18(1)–(2) (canton)	Arts. 2/50 vs 12 (contested)	Arts. 1, 10 vs 60(1) (contested)
Constitutional amendment rule	Arts. 55, 23(1) (unanimity of 4)	Arts. 202–205 (per-canton veto)	Art. 156 (dual 2/3 + referendum)
Per-unit veto on amendment	Art. 55(1)–(2)	Art. 205	Art. 156(4) (only over own-power cuts)
Secession / exit	Arts. 14(5), 33(2), 114 (permitted)	— (unity, Art. 1)	Arts. 4, 5 (barred)

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Inter-unit dispute forum	Art. 117(6) (int'l arbitration)	Arts. 117–118 (federal court)	Arts. 141, 142 (federal court)

7. Federal executive

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Composition	Art. 38 (4 cantonal PMs)	Art. 92 (6: 3+3 madhhab)	Art. 118 (6 confessions)
Selection	Art. 122 (ex officio)	Arts. 92–93 (by assembly)	Art. 117 (by Council of States)
Head / rotation	Arts. 39, 41 (by age, 1 yr)	Art. 95 (annual rotation)	Art. 120 (annual rotation)
Decision rule	Arts. 38(2), 39(3) (unanimity)	Art. 94 (consensus-preferred)	Art. 123 (consensus or 5/6)
Removal	Art. 43 (via cantonal exit)	Arts. 82, 96	Arts. 111(8), 141(9)
Foreign affairs / emergency	Arts. 25, 45, 62, 130	Arts. 83, 101, 102, 108	Arts. 111(9), 129, 130

8. Cantonal power structure

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Cantonal constitution	Art. 118(1)	Arts. 2, 130	Art. 54
Cantonal executive	Arts. 122–128	Arts. 160–174 (Governor; Art. 161 sect-reserved)	Arts. 55, 56 (elected Governor + council)
Cantonal legislature	Arts. 28a, 129	Arts. 131–152	Art. 58
Cantonal armed/security force	Art. 48(2) (own army)	— (Art. 10 bars cantonal armies)	Art. 60(6) (state guard)
Cantonal central bank	Art. 66	Art. 129 (federal CB)	Art. 148 (federal CB)

9. Judiciary — structure and reach (Q11-A)

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Two-tier judicial structure	Art. 70(2)–(3)	Arts. 175–182 + 116	Art. 136 (federal) + 141(7) (cantonal)
Who appoints cantonal judges	Arts. 75(2), 129(1)(i) (canton)	Art. 175 (local judicial council)	Art. 54 (each state's constitution)
Who appoints apex court	Art. 72(1) (cantons appoint)	Art. 116 (federal 2/3)	Arts. 138, 140 (judicial council + upper house)
Apex court jurisdiction	Art. 71	Arts. 117–118	Art. 141
Who has the last word	Art. 77(2) (cantonal court overrides federal)	Art. 179 (federal overturns cantonal)	Art. 142 (federal final and binding)
Individual rights complaint to apex	— (barred, Sec. X.5)	Art. 49 (cantons challenge federal)	Art. 141(6) (any person)

10. Judiciary — what it enforces (Q11-B) and minority protection

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Status of the rights charter	Art. 1 (default-only, cantonal-overridable)	Art. 6 (binds cantonal law)	Arts. 2(2)–(3) (binds all law)
Anti-review / notwithstanding hook	Sec. X(5) (bars rights-based strike-down)	—	—
International-law posture	Arts. 99, 117(3)–(5) (exit/rescind)	Preamble (Arab League, UN)	Preamble ; (UDHR incorporated)
Supra-positive minority mechanism	— (protection via self-rule)	Arts. 123–124 (Ombudsman court)	Arts. 44, 69-d, 141(6)
Bound primarily to	Cantonal citizens' will	Both demos + rights ceiling	Supra-positive rights + federal court

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Entrenchment of rights	Sec. X(5) (shielded from courts)	Art. 203 (referendum in each qada)	Art. 156(2) (double-entrenched)

11. Multi-order scaling for public goods

Theme	A — Boustany	B — Abawat	C — Zakhour
Subsidiarity default (smallest unit decides)	Municipality is smallest unit (Art. 20(8)); municipal self-government (Art. 118(4))	Municipal tier under fixed qadas (Art. 3)	Municipal tier under fixed districts (Arts. 65, 69)
Preset intermediate tiers	Abolished (Art. 94 removes caza / mohafaza)	16 fixed qadas (Arts. 1, 3)	Fixed districts + 3-district minimum (Arts. 53, 53-ġ)
Elastic per-project association	Associations of municipalities, no fixed size, cross-canton permitted (Art. 118(4)); Art. 59(2) <i>protects</i> them from federal task-loading	Same-sect merger only (Art. 3)	Preset opt-in thresholds (Art. 53)
Cross-unit infrastructure	Jointly held by affected cantons under unanimity (Art. 111) — not central capture	Canton utilities (Art. 195)	Shared networks reserved upward (Art. 76)
Multi-order verdict	Genuinely multi-order	Preset	Preset

How to use this appendix

Each row is a claim-checking shortcut: to verify any finding in Parts 1–5, open the cited article in the corresponding PDF. Where a cell shows two articles in tension (e.g., A's fiscal row, B's supremacy row, C's sovereignty row), that pairing *is* the internal contradiction flagged in the verdicts — the two provisions pull in opposite directions in the same document.